Does First In Time Really Mean First In Right? Exploring Water Rights in the Context of Klamath Irrigation District v. United States by Dunlap, Jordan





Does First In Time Really Mean First In Right? 
Exploring Water Rights in the Context of 
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 110 
I.  Background ........................................................................... 115 
A. Appropriative Rights in the Klamath Basin ................... 116 
1. The History of Appropriative Rights in the United 
States ........................................................................ 117 
a. Appropriation Under Traditional Common 
Law Doctrines .................................................... 118 
b. Appropriation Under the American System ....... 118 
c. Appropriation and Western Expansion .............. 119 
2. Appropriative Rights in the Klamath Basin ............. 122 
a. The Foundation of Federal Regulatory 
Authority ............................................................ 122 
b. The Foundation of State Regulatory Authority .. 123 
c. The Desert Land Act of 1877 ............................. 125 
B. Introduction to the Dispute: Klamath Irrigation 
District v. United States ................................................. 127 
1. The Facts: What’s Really Going On in the 
Klamath Basin .......................................................... 127 
a. The Klamath River ............................................. 127 
b. The Era of Reclamation ..................................... 129 
 
 Jordan Dunlap graduated from the University of Oregon School of Law in 2012. She 
would like to take this opportunity to thank Professors Adell Amos and Joan Rocklin for 
their encouragement and guidance during Jordan’s time at the University of Oregon. 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2013  2:08 PM 
110 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 28, 109 
c. Reclamation in the Klamath Basin .................... 131 
d. The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on 
the Klamath Project ........................................... 132 
e. Why the Bureau of Reclamation Refused to 
Divert Water ...................................................... 134 
2. The Claims: What Must the Court Decide? ............. 134 
a. The Irrigators’ Takings Claim ........................... 135 
b. The Irrigators’ Violation of Compact Claim...... 140 
c. The Irrigators’ Breach of Contract Claim .......... 140 
3. What Is Happening with the Case? .......................... 140 
II.  Discussion ............................................................................. 141 
A. Step One: The Irrigators’ Contract Claims .................... 141 
1. The Avoidance Doctrine .......................................... 142 
2. If the Court Finds that BOR Did Breach Its 
Contract(s) ................................................................ 145 
3. The Likely Outcome of This Decision ..................... 145 
B. Step Two: The Irrigators’ Takings Claim ...................... 146 
1. An Appropriative Right as a Beneficial Property 
Interest ...................................................................... 147 
2. Water Rights and the Fifth Amendment ................... 148 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 150 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 6, 2001, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) 
made the decision to not release water from the Klamath River to 
farmers within the Klamath Basin.1 The BOR’s decision was made in 
response to several reports, issued by other federal agencies, which 
concluded that if water from the Klamath River were to be diverted 
from the river system, the action would reduce the flow of water in 
the river to a level that would likely negatively impact several 
endangered species living in the river in violation of the Endangered 
Species Act2 (ESA).3 
Believing that if it released water from the River it would violate 
the ESA, the Bureau of Reclamation refrained from diverting water to 
 
1 See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath I), 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 512–13 
(2005). 
2 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West 2012) (known as the Endangered Species Act of 1973). 
3 See Klamath I, 67 Fed.Cl. at 512–13. 
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irrigators.4 This action reduced the amount of water that was eligible 
for delivery to irrigators by ninety percent, and resulted in rendering 
“approximately fourteen-hundred farmers who relied on [water 
diverted from the Klamath River] either unable to plant or [facing] 
severe losses on roughly 210,000 acres [of farmland].”5 BOR’s 
decision “triggered violence, protests, and political [responses] that 
reverberated throughout the West” during the summer and fall of 
2001.6 
In response to BOR’s action, the affected irrigators filed a 
complaint against the BOR.7 Within their complaint, the irrigators 
claimed that BOR’s actions were illegal, in breach of the BOR’s 
contracts with the irrigators, and constituted an unconstitutional 
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.8 
While the irrigators later conceded that the BOR’s actions were in 
fact within the authority of the agency and legal, the remaining 
contract and takings claims challenge both the boundaries of 
American water law and the authority of the federal government to 
regulate surface water within the United States. The Federal Court of 
Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court have both considered the 
issues presented by the irrigators. Yet, after a decade of litigation, the 
issues presented by the irrigators have yet to be resolved. 
The complexity and nature of American water law may be partly to 
blame for the delay in the resolution of the case’s issues. However, 
the complexity of water law is not solely to blame for the slow 
progress of the Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. U.S.9 litigation. The courts 
 
4 See id. In 1997, Coho salmon, native to the Klamath River System, were added to the 
United States’s list of threatened species. See HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, 
WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY 
POLITICS 103–07 (2008). This listing assigned the Coho additional protection in 
accordance with the Endangered Species Act. Id. At that time, the Coho joined the two 
species of fish living in Upper Klamath Lake, Lost River Sucker and the Shortnose 
Sucker, which had been listed since the 1980s. Id. The listing of Coho salmon was 
important because the decline in national salmon populations had recently gained national 
attention. Id. 
5 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 2. 
6 Id. 
7 Id.; see also Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 512–13 (2005). 
8 See generally Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 512–13. 
9 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Klamath II), 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 504. 
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are by no means strangers to challenges relating to water rights.10 
Instead, it is likely that the issues have not been resolved because of 
the weight of the central issue that lurks in irrigators’s claims against 
the BOR—an issue of first impression in the United States. 
Specifically, Klamath is the first case to ask the courts to determine 
exactly what rights from the proverbial “bundle of rights” a person 
holds when he or she is granted a right to appropriate water from his 
or her government.11 
On its face, the case presents a pair of fairly straightforward 
questions. First, Klamath asks the courts to determine whether BOR 
breached its contracts with the irrigators by refusing to divert water in 
accordance with the BOR’s existing contracts with the irrigators; this 
issue relates to contractually defined “appropriative rights”12 and is 
fairly well defined by Court precedent. What is more worrisome is the 
second question presented by the irrigators—did the BOR’s actions 
constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment?13 
Both questions presented by the irrigators relate to well established 
legal doctrines—breach of contract and unconstitutional government 
takings of private property. Typically, claims involving a breach of 
contract or government takings are easily resolved using legal 
precedent in the courts of the United States.14 The problem is, no 
 
10 See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648–52 (1978) (discussing the history 
of the application of the Reclamation Act of 1902 in the American West, the heart of the 
issues presented by the irrigators in Klamath); see also United States v. Gerlach Live 
Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736–37 (1950) (citing the holdings from United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940) which states, “[t]he flow of a 
navigable stream is in no sense private property; ‘that the running water in a great 
navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable,’” citing the Court’s 
earlier holding from United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 
(1913)). Together, these holdings outline the history of the Supreme Court’s examination 
of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the property interest in flowing water within a stream, and 
the contractual rights existing between BOR and those parties to whom the agency diverts 
water to from its irrigation projects located throughout the West. 
11 See Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 514. 
12 The term “appropriative right” is associated with a person’s control of water in 
jurisdictions that apply some form of the prior appropriation allocation system. See OR. 
REV. STAT. § 537.120 (2013) (an example of a western state’s use of the term 
“appropriative rights”). However, in this Note, “appropriative rights” refers to any 
situation where a person has the authority to appropriate water from a watercourse for his 
or her own use. 
13 See Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 514. 
14 Note, however, that the discussion of contractual rights and property rights is quite 
contentious in the Court, and there is much confusion around how these rights apply in the  
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American court has ever established what an appropriative right is in 
the context of property law.15 Therefore, if the irrigator’s claims 
cannot be settled under contract law, the court must attempt to 
determine whether an appropriative right may rise to the level of a 
property right, and if it can, whether an irrigator’s expectation interest 
in water can vest a property right in the irrigator. 
The issues presented by the irrigators in Klamath I and II16 seem 
fairly straightforward. The media paints the Klamath litigation as a 
case of two interests competing for a single resource–a case of farmer 
versus fish. On the surface, the case may be this simple. A group of 
irrigators assert that they were harmed by a government action 
intended to protect species of threatened and endangered fish. 
However, these facts only brush the surface of the issues at play in the 
litigation. 
Such categorization entirely overlooks the nexus of the dispute. 
Yes, it is true that Klamath involves a fight between farmers and 
parties looking to preserve fish habitat in the Klamath River, but these 
facts mask the real source and significance of the dispute—a dispute 
that runs far deeper than the protection of the habitat of a few 
endangered species of fish. Klamath is important because it is a 
dispute about the future of the use of water in the West, not because it 
relates to the preservation of a few endangered species. Irrigators are 
 
context of the Reclamation Act of 1902. See generally California v. United States, 438 
U.S. 645 (1978) (discussing contract rights and takings claims in association with the 
Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C.A §§ 372, 383 (West 2012)); see also id. (White, J., 
dissenting) (noting the complexity of the issues raised by the BOR’s application of the 
Reclamation Act in the context of California’s water laws, and the questions that still 
remain in the context of the Court’s interpretation of the Reclamation Act generally, and 
the Act’s application by federal agencies generally). 
15 While there is much case law on property rights associated with water flowing in a 
stream, namely in the context of owners of riparian property, there is little case law 
discussing the rights of owners of appropriative rights. In United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 at 69, the Court explicitly states that owning 
flowing water is something that is incomprehensible under American water law. However, 
in the next paragraph the Court asserts that,”[w]hatever substantial private property rights 
exist in the flow of the stream must come from some right which that company has to 
construct and maintain such works in the river, such as dams, walls, dykes, etc., essential 
to the utilization of the power of the stream for commercial purposes.” Id. This statement 
indicates that when a right to use a stream is granted by the government, that right is 
somewhat more secure than a normal right to use the stream. 
16 See generally Klamath II, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 
(2005). 
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asking the court to determine whether they can continue farming as 
they always have. 
The Klamath litigation highlights the ongoing cultural war that is 
waging in the American West. It showcases the battle between the 
status quo of the irrigation culture and the changes in demand that 
have occurred in response to the booming populations of western 
cities. Effectively, the courts are being asked to determine whether the 
rights irrigators hold in the water they are promised through state 
issued appropriation rights are similar to property interests as 
cognizable under the Fifth Amendment, or if they are more akin to 
Due Process property interests as cognizable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This is a question of federalism, of science, and most 
importantly, it is a question of cultural identity. In short, Klamath is 
not a case of farmer versus fish; it is a case of farmer versus change. 
One way or another, this case will forever change the way 
Americans look at water. The repercussions of any decision on this 
matter will be far reaching and will likely herald a new era of 
development in the West. If the irrigators are not held to hold 
property interests in the water they have rights to appropriate, the 
court will have established that appropriative rights are not property 
rights and, therefore may be subject to greater regulation. This 
situation would allow the government to reserve more water for 
public use and protection. 
On the other hand, if the irrigators win, then the court will have 
established that appropriative rights constitute property interests and 
are protected from government interference by the takings limitation 
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This decision would 
leave the government with a greatly reduced ability to regulate the 
quality and quantity of water because the decision would require the 
government to compensate owners of appropriative rights when its 
actions interfered with the owner’s use of his or her appropriative 
rights. This situation would not only deteriorate the public’s interest 
in water as a shared common, but would also move fresh water into 
the commodities sphere. 
This Note argues that the Court of Claims should adopt Justice 
Douglas’s position in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock,17 that 
appropriators are not entitled to compensation as a matter of 
Constitutional right,18 and find that the expectation interests that the 
 
17 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 756–57 (1950). 
18 Id. at 756. 
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irrigators of Klamath River Basin developed via appropriation rights 
do not constitute property interests in the water of the river. In 
accordance with this finding, the court should rule in favor of the 
BOR, finding that the actions of BOR did not constitute a taking 
because appropriative rights do not rise to the level of property rights 
as cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. This determination would 
resolve a long-standing question of law and advance the goals of 
efficiency and equity by clearly defining the property interests that are 
transferred to diverters of water through appropriative rights. 
To support this argument, this Note will discuss the history of the 
Klamath litigation, the claims asserted by the parties, and the likely 
repercussions of this litigation. In conclusion, this Note will argue that 
unless the irrigators can establish that the BOR somehow breached its 
contracts with the irrigators, the Court of Claims should not rule in 
favor of the irrigators. This Note will support this assertion by 
establishing that there is no legal basis for finding that an 




Klamath is a complicated case. A number of federal, state, and 
environmental factors make it possible for the BOR to divert water to 
irrigators in the Klamath Basin. If one of these factors were to change, 
the BOR would be unable to function. This is what happened in 2001. 
In 2001, the environmental and federal factors interacted in a way that 
made it impossible for the BOR to function as it always had, and the 
result was the BOR’s decision not to divert water from the Klamath 
for irrigation. 
In the following paragraphs, this Note will attempt to shed some 
light on the factors that led to the BOR’s shut off of irrigation water in 
2001. To do this, this Note will discuss in detail (A) the history of 
appropriative rights in the Klamath Basin; (B) what happened in the 
Klamath Basin that led to the litigation; and finally, (C) the claims 
before the Court of Claims. 
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A. Appropriative Rights in the Klamath Basin 
The Klamath Basin is located in an arid region of the West that 
straddles portions of southern Oregon and northern California.19 Like 
most western states, California and Oregon have very few sources of 
surface water.20 The shortage of water made the application of 
traditional systems of water appropriation difficult for both states.21 In 
the beginning, California and Oregon attempted to apply the 
traditional systems of water appropriation.22 However, it soon became 
clear that traditional systems of appropriation, which tied 
appropriative rights in water to land ownership, were unsuitable 
within their territories and left the states unable to meet their 
residents’ demand for water.23 
Faced with exploding populations brought west by promises of 
gold and cheap land, the states were forced to reevaluate the way they 
supplied their residents with water.24 To meet the growing demand for 
fresh water, both states took steps to implement systems of water 
appropriation that were uniquely tailored to their own 
circumstances.25 These new systems of appropriation were developed 
in a manner that allowed the state to put what little water it had to 
use.26 Based on the custom of prior appropriation, the systems for 
appropriation adopted by California and Oregon revolutionized the 
use and accessibility of water within their borders by severing the 
right of use from land ownership.27 Without these systems, neither 
Oregon nor California would have been able to support their 
population centers, or expansive farming operations. 
Whether or not we agree with these systems today is 
inconsequential. The fact of the matter is, the states adopted new 
 
19 See Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 512–13 (2005); see also Russ Rymer, Reuniting a 
River, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, Dec. 2008, available at http://ngm.national 
geographic.com/print/2008/12/klamath-river/rymer-text. 
20 JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 7–10 (4th ed. 2006). 
21 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 37–39. 
22 Id. at 38–40. 
23 Id. at 40–43. 
24 Id. at 39–41. 
25 Id. at 42–43. 
26 See generally DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 41–46; SAX ET AL., supra note 
20, at 29–33; Western States Water Laws: Water Appropriation Systems, U.S. BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT., http://archive.org/details/westernstateswat4002heco (last visited Sept. 1, 
2013) (discussing the differences between appropriative and riparian rights to water). 
27 See generally DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 41–46; SAX ET AL., supra note 
20, 29–33; U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 26. 
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systems of appropriation for the purpose of developing the West.28 
Using the draw of cheap land, and subsidizing that land with an 
inexpensive supply of water, enabled the states to secure political and 
economic security.29 If Oregon and California had not supplied their 
settlers with water, their land would not have been developed, and the 
states would look very different than they do today. 
The problem is, when the states adopted their appropriation 
systems, states did not define what rights they were transferring to 
appropriators through the issuance of private appropriative rights. 
Without a clear articulation of what rights were transferred along with 
an appropriative right, the courts are left with the daunting task of 
determining what rights irrigators in the Klamath Basin can expect to 
attach to their appropriative rights. 
To shed light on what rights could be vested in an irrigator through 
an appropriative right, this Note will attempt to clarify (1) what an 
appropriative right is generally; and (2) what rights were transferred 
to appropriators in the Klamath Basin. 
1. The History of Appropriative Rights in the United States 
An appropriative right to water is simply a person’s authority to 
divert and control water from a specific body of water for his or her 
own use.30 From a historical perspective, people have always had a 
right to divert water from a watercourse for his or her personal use. 
Traditionally, this right was rarely challenged because water has 
historically been viewed as a shared common. However, over the 
course of the last several hundred years, population changes and the 
development of less than optimal environments have forced 
governments to reexamine the traditional view of water. In response 
to these changes, water law has to evolve to address society’s 
increasing demand for water. In the following paragraphs this Note 
will discuss the evolution of water appropriation from the ancient 
doctrine of natural flow to the modern doctrine of prior appropriation, 
an evolution that developed the ancient common into a modern 
commodity. 
 
28 See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 29–33. 
29 See generally id. 
30  U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 26 (discussing the differences between 
appropriative and riparian rights in regard to the appropriation of water resources). 
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a. Appropriation Under Traditional Common Law Doctrines 
When the United States was first settled, British settlers brought 
with them a system of water appropriation based on the English 
common law doctrine of natural flow.31 Under this doctrine, only 
owners of riparian land, land abutting a watercourse, could use the 
water from the watercourse. Additionally, any use of water was 
restricted to the riparian land. This doctrine tied an appropriative right 
to land ownership. A right to use the waters of a watercourse vested in 
all landowners whose property touched that watercourse.32 The right 
to use water of the stream was attached to the property rights 
associated with ownership of the riparian land and could be 
transferred only with the land.33 Under this traditional system of 
appropriation, the only restriction on an appropriator’s use of the 
water in an abutting stream was to leave the waters of the stream 
“undiminished in quantity and quality.”34 
This English system valued water in its natural course, largely 
ignoring its value as a commodity.35 While the system did allow 
riparian owners to use water on track, those uses were required to 
leave the stream in its natural condition.36 The basic premise of the 
system was to highlight water’s quality as a shared resource. Owners 
of land were entitled to use any abutting stream simply because use of 
such water flowed from ownership of riparian land. Each landowner 
was entitled to his or her share of an undiminished stream. From this 
sense of entitlement flowed a sense of ownership that mimicked land 
ownership. However, the doctrine placed an important restriction on 
such use—a riparian owner’s use of a stream could not frustrate a 
downstream owner’s use. Under the common law, any property 
interest held by the landowner in the water was considered a shared 
right of use not an exclusive property right that could be used to 
exclude others from using that landowner’s water. 
b. Appropriation Under the American System 
The natural flow doctrine was unanimously followed by courts in 
the United States until fairly recently in the country’s history. For 
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over two hundred years the doctrine worked well in the eastern 
regions of the United States.37 However, expansion and development 
during the industrial revolution, starting in the second-half of the 
nineteenth century, began to undermine the usefulness of the rule in 
an era of rapid industrial growth.38 
For the first time in history, water was needed for consumptive 
uses, and the natural flow doctrine specifically forbids such uses 
because they require depletion of the quantity and / or the quality of 
water in shared watercourses.39 In an attempt to address the 
developing needs of industry, American courts dismissed traditional 
doctrines of appropriation in favor of a riparian doctrine that applied a 
“reasonable use” standard to uses.40 Under the new American 
reasonable use doctrine, water could, for the first time in history, be 
diverted from a watercourse for consumptive uses that diminished the 
quality and quantity of the flow in order to promote the development 
of industry.41 
c. Appropriation and Western Expansion 
Under the American system of appropriation, a person could divert 
water from a watercourse for a consumptive use, a use that would 
deplete the quantity or quality of water in a watercourse. This allowed 
for riparian owners to apply water to consumptive uses. The problem 
was, the American doctrine still required that appropriators be 
riparian landowners. A requirement that made development of the 
expansive states in the western United States extremely difficult. 
 
37 See SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 37. 
38 See id. at 37–39. 
39 See id. at 39. 
40 Id. at 43; Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1856) (“There is no doubt one must be 
allowed to use a stream in such a manner as to make it useful to himself, even if it do 
produce slight inconvenience to those below.”). 
41 See Snow, 28 Vt. at 459. The Supreme Court of Vermont explicitly rejects the 
traditional natural flow doctrine in favor of a doctrine that allowed riparian land owners to 
make reasonable withdraws from streams for industrial purposes. Id. In Snow, the court 
explicitly notes that “[w]ithin reasonable limits, those who have a common interest in the 
use of air and running water, must submit to small inconveniences to afford a 
disproportionate advantage to others.” Id. at 462. Therefore, the reasonableness of the use 
became the key to determining whether or not an appropriation of the stream was proper: a 
direct departure from earlier standards forbidding uses that harmed the natural state of a 
stream at all. See generally id. at 464–65. 
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In the East, most people live within a few acres of a stream, and 
rainfall is both abundant and regular.42 This situation makes 
developing farmland in the East fairly easy because farmers can 
depend on annual rainfall and easy access to streams, rivers, and 
springs to irrigate their crops. In contrast, most western regions 
receive substantially less rainfall than the regions in the eastern half 
of the United States, and the only thing western regions can count on 
in terms of rainfall is that any rain will be irregular and sporadic.43 
Exasperating the minimal levels of annual precipitation is the fact that 
streams are few and far between.44 
This situation limited western development and expansion because 
under the American doctrine riparian owners could only use water on 
land that abutted the watercourse from which the water was being 
diverted.45 The riparian requirement that required water to stay on the 
riparian tract of land prevented vast areas of western states from being 
developed.46 Therefore, in order to develop their lands, western states 
were forced to adopt a new system of appropriation tailored to their 
unique environments.47 This new system, known as prior 
appropriation, severed water rights from ownership of land and 
allowed the public to divert water for use on non-riparian land.48 
Under the system of prior appropriation, the first person to divert 
water from a watercourse and put that water to beneficial use 
established a right to use the water he or she diverted.49 Additionally, 
the earlier that a person diverted water and put that water to a 
beneficial use, the greater that person’s right to the water.50 As 
applied, the system allowed diverters to take as much water as they 
needed from a watercourse and continue to take that water every year, 
as long as the diverter could establish that he or she was actually 
putting water to some beneficial use.51 The only way to divest such a 
 
42 See SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 6–8, 10 (describing the levels of annual 
precipitation and water supplies of the different regions of the United States). 
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 See generally id. at 27–33. 
46  U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 26 (discussing the differences between 
appropriative and riparian rights to water). 
47 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 38–39. 
48 Id. 
49 See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 124–26. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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right was to establish that the diverter was not using the full amount 
of water diverting.52 
Under the system of prior appropriation, the right to use water from 
a watercourse was severed from the traditional riparian ownership 
requirement.53 Instead, an appropriative right based on prior 
appropriation was established as an expectancy interest developed in 
the water of the stream itself.54 The idea being that if there is water in 
the stream, and a diverter has the superior right to that water, that 
diverter may reasonably expect that he or she would be able to divert 
that water for his or her use.55 
The problem is states applying this doctrine have never clearly 
articulated what rights they are transferring to diverters. Under the 
earlier systems of allocation, landowners understood that they had a 
shared right to the water in the watercourse and that the right was tied 
to their ownership of land. Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, 
the severance of water from land ownership has undermined the 
“shared” quality of the resource. 
This begs the question of whether an appropriative right 
established through a system of prior appropriation transfers more 
rights than the water rights associated with earlier systems of 
allocation. States have taken steps to document appropriative rights, 
even issuing permits for diverters that specifically outline when an 
appropriator may divert water from a watercourse and how much 
water he or she may divert. However, states have failed to identify 
what rights in the water an appropriator may expect to acquire 
through these permits. Diverters generally understand the concept that 
those among them who established appropriative rights first, have 
greater rights to the water in the stream than those diverters who 
established their rights later. 
 
52 State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051–55 (Wash. 1993). 
53 See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 124–26; U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
supra note 26 (discussing the differences between appropriative and riparian rights to 
water). 
54 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 38–39; SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 152–
153; U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 26 (discussing the differences between 
appropriative and riparian rights to water). 
55 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 38–39; SAX, supra note 20, at 152–53; U.S. 
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 26 (discussing the differences between 
appropriative and riparian rights to water). 
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The problem is, states have never established what “first in time, 
first in right” actually means in the context of actual property rights. 
Under earlier systems, a right to use water was one right in the bundle 
held by owners of real property. This is not the case for diverters who 
have state issued rights based on the system of prior appropriation. 
Therefore, it is important for appropriators to determine which rights 
the states actually transferred within the appropriative right in order to 
understand which rights to the water have vested through the 
appropriative right. 
2. Appropriative Rights in the Klamath Basin 
The big question imputed through the Klamath litigation is which 
rights vested in the irrigators through their appropriative rights. To 
answer this question, the court must determine which rights are 
attached to an appropriative right. Once the court ascertains what the 
bundle of rights associated with an appropriative right actually entails, 
it can then attempt to determine whether those rights constitute a 
property right to water. 
In the context of Klamath, California and Oregon instituted their 
own unique systems for allocating water. The states were able to 
implement their own system of allocation because water law is 
traditionally an area of law reserved for the states. This regulatory 
authority is based on English common law traditions that were 
adopted by the United States at its founding. Understanding the basis 
and rationale for the traditional authority of state water regulation will 
help to clarify which rights to water are held by the federal 
government, the states, and private parties. 
a. The Foundation of Federal Regulatory Authority 
As discussed above, the first American settlers applied English 
common law doctrines to water allocation.56 During that period of 
American history, the English Crown held title to all navigable water 
and lands within the American territory.57 However, after the 
Revolutionary War, title to this property transferred to the federal 
government of the United States.58 At that time, the United States 
 
56 See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 409–10 (1842) (“According to the 
theory of the British constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the crown, as representing 
the nation, and the exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a 
branch of the royal prerogative.”). 
57 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 523; Martin, 41 U.S. at 410. 
58 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 523. 
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government became the successor in interest to the waters and lands 
of the United States once held by the English Crown.59 
b. The Foundation of State Regulatory Authority 
In order to divest itself of this property, and grow revenue, the U.S. 
federal government began to transfer title to this property to the 
states.60 In accordance with the Equal Footing Doctrine, when a state 
was added to the Union, the federal government would grant that state 
title to the lands and waters included within the territory of the state.61 
However, as Justice Field articled in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois,62 the federal government did not grant the states absolute title 
to the resources transferred to the state pursuant to the Equal Footing 
Doctrine.63 
The idea behind the Equal Footing Doctrine is that each state, upon 
admittance to the Union, is granted an equal trust in the lands and 
waters of its territory.64 The Doctrine applies at the time states are 
inducted into the Union and is intended to ensure that all states are 
admitted on an equal basis.65 What the Doctrine does not do is admit 
 
59 Id.; Martin at 409–10. 
60 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 523. 
61 Id. 
62 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 434, 452 (1892). 
63 See id. (noting that while all states are inducted into the Union on an equal footing 
with all other states, that the title to land transferred at that time “is different from the title 
which the United States hold in the public lands . . . It is a title held in trust for the people 
of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of 
private parties.”). In Illinois Central Railroad Company, Congress along with the City of 
Chicago passed legislation granting the Railroad an exclusive right to develop the Chicago 
harbor, a parcel of land located below the navigable waters of Lake Michigan. Id. at 439–
42. The state of Illinois filed suit against the Railroad claiming that the State had an 
exclusive right to develop submerged lands below navigable bodies of water within it 
borders. Id. The Court held in favor of the State, finding that 
[t]he ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor, and of the lands under them, 
is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the state. The trust with which 
they [the lands and waters of the state] are held . . . is governmental, and cannot be 
alienated, except . . . when parcels can be disposed of without detriment to the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining. 
Id. at 455–56. 
64 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 523; 146 U.S. at 434–35. 
65 Or. ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 373 (1977) 
(recognizing that “new States would be admitted ‘upon an equal footing, in all respects’     
. . . with the original States.” The Court cites Martin v. Weddell’s Lessee, noting that the  
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states into the Union on an equal footing with the federal 
government.66 
It is clear that the Equal Footing Doctrine grants states title to the 
lands of their territories, including submerged land below navigable 
waters.67 What is unclear is whether the Doctrine grants states title to 
the water that flows in the states’ navigable waterways.68 Because title 
to water is not expressly or impliedly granted at statehood, and the 
federal government retains a right to impede on a state’s authority to 
control the water flowing in watercourses in which states hold title to 
the submerged lands, there is a question as to whether water was ever 
intended to be subject to title. 
In light of the traditional view of water as a shared common for 
which the Crown had full authority to control, it seems apparent that 
the founders intended water to be reserved for the federal sovereign to 
control, and not the states. The Equal Footing Doctrine provides that 
all land and submerged lands will be conveyed to the states upon 
statehood. However, the Doctrine is silent as to whether the states will 
receive the water in the watercourses as well. From a traditional 
perspective, one could argue that the Doctrine, by conveying riparian 
land to the states, conveyed the appropriative rights associated with 
riparian land ownership to the states. 
The problem is, states normally did not receive title to all riparian 
land upon statehood. The federal government, previous private land 
grants, and Indian tribes in many instances maintained ownership of 
riparian parcels after statehood. This leaves the states and the federal 
government trying to figure out which entity holds title to the water. 
 
original States held the “absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under 
them for their own common use, subject only” to rights to in land and waters that were not 
“surrendered by the Constitution.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
66 See generally id. at 373–74. The Court explains that the Equal Footing Doctrine is a 
Constitutional conveyance of title in all land in a state’s territory to the state government. 
While, the Court notes that this conveyance may not be “defeated” by an act of Congress 
or its grant of such lands to a third party, the Court’s precedent does not articulate what 
title in water is granted to the states. See id. However, the Court does indicate that the 
conveyance of title pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine is subject to the Congress’s 
enumerated powers as dictated by the Constitution. See id. at 374–75. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 374 n.5 (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229–30 (1845) (the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the Equal Footing Doctrine did not limit Congress’s authority to 
regulate commerce on navigable waters within Alabama’s territory)). 
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c. The Desert Land Act of 1877 
During the second-half of the nineteenth century, Congress became 
increasingly aware of the constraints that the West’s hydrology placed 
on western expansion. By the 1860s, the federal government had 
acquired hundreds of thousands of acres of land in the western United 
States. However, in most instances that land was not riparian and was 
typically located far away from a water source. 
In an attempt to overcome this limitation, Congress passed the 
Desert Land Act in 1877.69 The purpose of the Desert Land Act was 
to promote western expansion of the United States through the 
settlement of the West.70 To fulfill this purpose, the Desert Land Act 
severed riparian rights from federal land in the West and conveyed 
parcels of that land to Americans who agreed to settle the West.71 The 
Act held that “all water not actually appropriated ‘shall remain and be 
held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, 
mining, and manufacturing . . . .’”72 While the Desert Land Act was 
important for the settlement of the West, it is most known for its 
effect on American water law. 
The effect of the Act was to explicitly exclude the recipients of 
federal land grants, settlers, from obtaining traditional riparian water 
rights, the right to appropriate water from watercourses abutting their 
land.73 States interpreted the language of the Act as Congress’s 
express severance of all public rights in water in acquiescence of the 
adoption of state appropriation systems.74 The Act seems to 
accomplish this goal by severing the riparian rights that would 
typically be enjoyed by the settlers who received riparian parcels of 
federal land through the Desert Land Act.75 By excluding riparian 
rights from the rights transferred through federal land grants, 
Congress enabled states to institute their own systems of water 
 
69 Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 
U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 2012)). The purpose of the Act was “to facilitate the reclamation of 
[desert land] by private entrymen.” United States v. Hanson, 167 F. 881, 883 (9th Cir. 
1909). 
70 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 2012). 
71 Id. 
72 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 39 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 321). 
73 Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155–56 (1935). 
74 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 39. 
75 Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 155–56; DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 39. 
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allocation,76 thereby enabling new western states to institute systems 
of water appropriation that could maximize the use of the resource.77 
In response, most western states have, because of their limited 
supplies of surface water, implemented systems of appropriation that 
reflect some form of the doctrine of prior appropriation.78 Under this 
system, 
[t]he person holding the most senior (oldest) right is entitled to have 
his or her entitlement fully satisfied before the next most senior 
person receives water, and so on. Thus, in times of shortage, the 
most senior right holder is entitled to insist that junior users curtail 
their use in order that the senior have sufficient water to satisfy his 
senior right.79 
Accordingly, in 1909, the Oregon legislature adopted Title 45, 
known as the Water Rights Act of 1909.80 The Water Rights Act 
codifies Oregon’s system of prior appropriation.81 Under the Oregon 
system, to establish a right an appropriator must divert water from a 
watercourse and put it to a beneficial use.82 However, in a 
revolutionary move, Oregon required that all appropriators register 
 
76 Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 164; see also SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 351. The 
Desert Land Act allowed settlers to claim up to 640 acres of public land. Id. Settlers of 
these tracts of public land “were entitled only to as much water as was actually 
appropriated and necessarily used for irrigation on [that land].” Id. All “surplus” water, 
water that was not necessary for irrigation of a specific tract of land, was “held free for the 
appropriation and use of the public for” other beneficial purposes that had existing rights. 
Id. at 351–52. In the Act, Congress does not explicitly suggest that western states must 
implement a specific system of appropriation, but in Cal. Or. Power Co., the Court 
interprets this silence as Congress “sanction[ing] . . . state and local doctrine[s] of 
appropriation.” See Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 164. Therefore, the effect of the Act is 
to enable states to adopt their own systems of appropriation free from the “impediment” of 
common law riparianism. Id. 
77 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 325; DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 39. 
78 See SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 325–26. 
79 See Klamath I, supra note 1. 
80 OR. REV. STAT. § 537.120 (2009). 
81 Id. (The statute holds that, “all waters within the state may be appropriated for 
beneficial use, as provided by the Water Rights Act.”). 
82 OR. REV. STAT. § 539.240 (Pursuant to the Oregon system of prior appropriation, all 
water rights vested prior to 1909 must be registered so that the state may determine 
whether the claimed water was diverted and put to a beneficial use in accordance with 
Oregon’s system of prior appropriation. However, after the Water Rights Act was enacted 
in 1909, appropriators could only acquire water rights by obtaining a permit from the state 
in accordance with OR. REV. STAT. § 537.120.). See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.120; United 
States v. Or. Water Res. Dep’t., 44 F.3d 758, 764 (Or. 1994). 
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their rights with the state before a private water right would vest.83 
This action worked to divest any holders of a riparian right of that 
appropriative right if the holder did not register with the state, thereby 
turning riparian rights into rights to appropriate under prior 
appropriation.84 
B. Introduction to the Dispute: Klamath Irrigation District v. 
United States 
1. The Facts: What’s Really Going On in the Klamath Basin 
The issue at the root of the conflict is simple: which materially 
adverse interest group should dictate the use of the Klamath? 
However, understanding the source of the conflict only illuminates 
one small part of the dispute. Arguing that the dispute is between fish 
and farmers oversimplifies the conflict. Instead, the fight surrounding 
the Klamath involves much more entrenched issues that can only be 
understood when read in context. In the following paragraphs, this 
Note will clarify the conflict by further discussing (a) the unique 
system of the Klamath River; (b) the Klamath Project; (c) the impact 
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) on the Klamath Project; and 
finally, (d) the situation that led to the BOR’s refusal to divert water 
from the Klamath for irrigators in the Klamath Basin. 
a. The Klamath River 
The Klamath River runs through some of the most inhospitable and 
remote country in the continental United States.85 Draining a vast 
region, encompassing portions of south central Oregon and northern 
California, the Klamath River encompasses around “12,000 square 
miles, an area roughly the size of Maryland and bigger than eight 
other U.S. states.”86 
Officially, the Klamath River’s headwaters begin in Lake Ewauna, 
near Klamath Falls; however, those who have visited the headwaters 
can easily see that the river is fed by snowmelt from the Cascade 
 
83 See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.120; United States v. Or. Water Res. Dep’t, 44 F.3d 758, 
764 (Or. 1994). 
84 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 40. 
85 Rymer, supra note 19. 
86 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 23. 
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Mountains stored in Upper Klamath Lake.87 Fed by snow melt in the 
“Upper Basin,” the river is augmented by the Scott, Shasta, Salmon, 
and Trinity rivers as it runs through California on its way to the 
Pacific Ocean.88 However, it is this 263-mile procession that makes 
the river unique. 
In most watersheds, rivers start in the wettest, steepest region of 
their watersheds and end in the driest and flattest region. This is not 
the case for the Klamath. Unlike most rivers, the Klamath grows 
wetter, wilder, and more rugged as it descends to the California 
Coast.89 Therefore, the Klamath’s “unusual topography plays an 
important role in its water problems.”90 
In most watersheds in the West, the upstream regions of a 
watershed are home to geological formations that allow water storage 
to occur upstream of agriculture.91 Typically, the upstream regions of 
a watershed will receive more precipitation and will be home to 
geological diversity (defined by “steep canyons and deep valleys”).92 
Having these kinds of geological features upstream of agricultural 
projects allows irrigators to build large water storage projects in the 
form of deep reservoirs that allow them to store large amounts of 
water upstream of the flatter, more arid regions where their 
agricultural uses occur.93 
This is not the case in the Klamath Basin. Instead, the “Lower 
Basin,” the region closest to the California Coast, receives more 
precipitation and is geologically diverse, while the “Upper Basin,” the 
region near Klamath Falls, is arid and fairly flat.94 This topography 
makes large storage projects nearly impossible in the Upper Basin 
where water is most desperately needed for agriculture. Therefore, the 
best water storage projects on the river can only occur downstream of 
the river’s agricultural projects.95 This means that in dry years the 
river is more susceptible to water issues than most rivers simply 





89 Rymer, supra note 19. 





95 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 25. 
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Water shortages in the Klamath Basin are exasperated by the fact 
that the agricultural center which applies water from the river is 
located in a region where “precipitation is highly variable from year 
to year,” a region where “[p]eriodic droughts are the norm” not the 
exception, and “[a]gricultural water demand exceeds supply in about 
seven out of every ten years.”96 
The Upper Basin lies at the foot of a volcanic mountain range 
extending from California to Washington. This proximity to recently 
active volcanoes makes the region’s soil especially fertile.97 However, 
when settlers first entered the Upper Basin, the high, cold, and dry 
country made farming extremely difficult.98 This difficult situation 
was exasperated by the region’s frequent droughts, frosts, and a short 
growing season. This combination of environmental conditions left 
the Klamath Basin relatively undeveloped until late into the 
nineteenth century. The implementation of a government sponsored 
irrigation project has allowed for the development of a strong 
agricultural industry in the Upper Basin. 
b. The Era of Reclamation 
In 1902, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act.99 The Reclamation 
Act attempted to promote western expansion by making water more 
accessible to homesteaders developing government land grants 
throughout the West.100 The program was created to help fund and 
develop large water storage projects that could hold and disperse 
enough water to support farming projects in agricultural areas 
throughout the West.101 Through the Reclamation Act, the federal 
government funded the construction and operation of numerous large 
water storage projects developed to divert water for irrigation.102 The 
Act created the United States Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), a federal 
 
96 Id. at 26. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 37. 
99 Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
43 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2012)). 
100 See SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 746–47. 
101 Id. at 747. 
102 See id. 
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agency created to oversee the dispersal of water from the storage 
projects.103 
The BOR had two responsibilities under the Act.104 First, the BOR 
was responsible for constructing and maintaining the large water 
projects.105 Once constructed, the BOR was then responsible for 
contracting with local irrigators in order to disperse the waters 
collected in the project.106 The main rationale for the projects was to 
promote permanent settlement in the West, and, by issuing water to 
irrigators.107 The federal government believed this would encourage 
such settlement.108 
These projects, it should be noted, were not self-sustaining.109 The 
contracts that the BOR entered into with contractors did not cover the 
cost of the projects; instead, they simply ensured that irrigators would 
receive subsidized water from the projects in accordance with the 
doctrine of prior appropriation.110 In accordance with these contracts, 
the Bureau of Reclamation released water to the irrigators.111 
In 1939, Congress amended the Reclamation Act through the 
enactment of the Reclamation Project Act.112 The Reclamation Project 
Act was created to amend the Reclamation Act in a manner that 
would allow the BOR to deliver water to irrigators at rates that the 
BOR found appropriate.113 Additionally, the terms of the Reclamation 
Act clarified the law that the Bureau had to follow when supplying 
water to irrigators.114 The amendment established that the BOR was 
required to follow state law when distributing water unless the state 
law was inconsistent with a clear Congressional directive.115 
 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
106 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 44. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 747. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 43 U.S.C.A. § 485 (West 2012), 53 Stat. 1187, § 
9. 
113 See SAX ET AL., supra note 20, at 748. 
114 See id. at 746–47. 
115 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 665–66 (1978). Discusses the meaning of 
§ 8 of the Reclamation Act which states that “nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
affecting or . . . interfer[ing] with the laws of any State . . . relating to the control, 
appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired 
thereunder.” 53 Stat. 1187, § 8, 43 U.S.C.A. § 383 (West 2012); “Under the clear language  
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2013  2:08 PM 
2013] Does First In Time Really Mean First In Right? 131 
Exploring Water Rights in the Context of 
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States 
c. Reclamation in the Klamath Basin 
In 1905, the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) authorized one of the 
first reclamation projects in the United States. This project–the 
Klamath Project–consisted of a system of dams and was intended to 
supply homesteaders in the Klamath Basin with water for irrigation 
purposes.116 The legislation permitting the construction of the project 
specifically authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior [to] carry[] out any irrigation project . . . to 
raise or lower the level of the lakes and rivers of the Klamath River 
Basin as may be necessary and to dispose of any lands which may 
come into the possession of the United States as a result thereof.117 
The Klamath Project was an enormous endeavor because it 
required the BOR to provide irrigators with enough to water to 
support 240,000 acres of farmland and several wildlife refuges.118 The 
problem was, and still is, that the Project is located in a geological 
region that is not conducive to water storage projects.119 Completed in 
the 1960s, the Klamath project provides water to irrigators in the 
Upper Klamath Basin.120 “Today, the project diverts about 1,345,000 
acre-feet” of water annually to irrigate farmland in both California 
and Oregon.121 Most of this water goes to the production of alfalfa, 
hay, and potatoes.122 However, the amount of potatoes produced in 
the project area has been greatly reduced in recent years due to the 
amount of water necessary for potato production.123 
 
of § 8 and in light of its legislative history, a State may impose any condition on ‘control, 
appropriation, use or distribution of water’ in a federal reclamation project that is not 
inconsistent with clear congressional directives respecting the project.” California, 438 
U.S. at 645. 
116 Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 509–10 (2005); DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 
47–48, 50. 
117 Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 509–10 (quoting Act of February 9, 1905, ch. 567, 33 Stat. 
714 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A § 601 (West 2012))). 
118 Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 509–10. 
119 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that the Klamath Project uses 
gravity to distribute water to irrigators in the Klamath Basin). According to Doremus, the 
Project is prone to water disputes because the Project is unable to store large amounts of 
water. This means that in wet years, the Project cannot retain and store extra water for 
delivery in dry years. Id. 
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Although irrigation of the Klamath Basin’s most water-consuming 
crop, potatoes, has decreased in recent years, irrigation in the Klamath 
Basin remains terribly inefficient.124 According to a study conducted 
by the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, only 
54% of the water diverted from the Klamath Project for irrigation was 
“consumed by crops.”125 This statistic underscores the problems 
facing the Klamath Project in the Klamath Basin; in short, the 
irrigation practices enlisted in the Basin are antiquated and are 
“inefficient by western irrigation standards.”126 According to Western 
Water Policy Review’s study, for every acre-foot of water actually 
consumed by crops in the Klamath Basin, two acre-feet were lost to 
evaporation.127 
These wasteful irrigation practices, the rapid development of the 
environmental movement, and the growing influence of Indian 
interests on the Klamath River have for years undermined the 
popularity of the Klamath Project both in the Klamath Basin and on a 
national scale. However, the status quo of waste and agricultural 
centric economies remained relatively unchallenged in the basin until 
coho salmon, a species of salmon native to the Klamath River, were 
listed as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act in 
1997.128 
d. The Impact of the Endangered Species Act on the Klamath Project 
The Endangered Species Act129 (ESA) was passed in 1973. The 
purpose of the ESA is to protect species of wildlife that are threatened 
with extinction.130 The ESA accomplishes this goal by attaching 
heightened standards of protection to individual species, instead of 
attempting to preserve entire ecosystems.131 In the United States, the 
Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service are 
responsible for ensuring that threatened and endangered species listed 
 
124 Id. 
125 SALE KIRKPATRICK, DWELLERS IN THE LAND: THE BIOREGIONAL VISION 41 
(1985). 
126 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 50. 
127 Id. 
128 Klamath I, 67 Fed Cl. 504, 509–10 (2005). 
129 16 U.S.C.A § 1536 (West 2012). 
130 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 90. 
131 Id. 
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under the ESA are protected from public and private actions that 
could harm the species.132 
When species protected under the ESA live in aquatic habitats, 
they are typically harmed by the quality and quantity of the water 
flowing through the habitat.133 This factor makes protection of aquatic 
species more difficult because in aquatic habitats, unlike situations 
with terrestrial species who are typically harmed by a specific action 
intended to harm a member of the species, harm to listed species is 
often incidental, resulting from actions that have substantial economic 
value associated with the river system and not the individual 
species.134 Therefore, it is hard to point a finger at any specific action 
as being the direct result of the harm to the listed species.135 
In such cases, the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine 
Fisheries Service call for federal and state agencies to implement 
limitations regarding the amount and timing of water being diverted 
from watercourses.136 These limitations, in many circumstances, 
impede on state and federal water rights, as well as privately held 
appropriative rights.137 
The problem is, while “Congress has repeatedly indicated a vague 
intent to give some deference to state authority over water allocation,” 
it has never attempted to exclude authority to regulate water from 
federally created environmental legislation.138 Congress’s reluctance 
to exclude water from federal regulation has left states and private 
appropriators in a confusing situation in which state authority to 
regulate water is subject to federal regulation.139 However, there is no 
clear Congressional directive explicitly stating that state law is 
intended to supersede federal regulation.140 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 95. 
134 Id. at 107. 
135 See id. 
136 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 95. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 96. 
139 Id. (commenting on the fact that while Congress has indicated that states are 
supposed to control water allocation, it has refused to guarantee states the sole authority in 
the regulation of water). 
140 Id. 
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e. Why the Bureau of Reclamation Refused to Divert Water 
The BOR was operating under this uncertainty in 2001 when all 
forecasts indicated that the Klamath Basin was rearing up for a 
summer to be defined by severe drought. As a federal agency, the 
BOR is obligated to comply with the ESA. Therefore, in light of the 
drought conditions present in the Klamath Basin in 2001, the BOR 
was obligated to take steps to protect any listed species that would be 
impacted by its actions within the Klamath Basin. In 2001, that meant 
the BOR was forced to choose between diverting water in compliance 
with its contracts with irrigators and refusing to divert water in order 
to maintain flow levels in the Klamath River sufficient for the 
protection of three listed species.141 
In April of 2001, after extensive study, the BOR concluded that the 
ESA required it to refrain from diverting water for irrigation in order 
to maintain minimum flow levels within the Klamath River system.142 
That spring, the BOR shut water off to irrigation projects because it 
believed that the ESA required it to take this action.143 Had the BOR 
refused to comply with the ESA, and instead allowed for diversions 
from the Klamath for irrigation, the BOR believed it would have been 
subject to litigation for non-compliance with the ESA.144 Therefore, 
the BOR refused to divert water for irrigation in order to comply with 
the ESA.145 
As a result of the BOR’s decision, irrigators sustained economic 
damages resulting from the BOR’s refusal to release water from the 
Klamath River for irrigation purposes.146 In response to these 
economic damages, the irrigators filed claims in the Court of Federal 
Claims on October 11, 2001.147 
2. The Claims: What Must the Court Decide? 
In the irrigators’ second amended complaint, they asserted three 
claims against the BOR. The irrigators’ alleged that the BOR’s 
actions (a) constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution; (b) violated the Klamath Basin Compact; and 
 
141 Klamath II, 635 F.3d 505, 509–10 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
142 DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 103. 
143 Id. at 99–100. 
144 Id. at 100–01; see Klamath II, 635 F.3d at 509. 
145 Klamath II, 635 F.3d at 509. 
146 See id. at 509–10. 
147 Id. at 509. 
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finally, (c) breached the BOR’s water service contracts with the 
irrigators.148 In the following paragraphs this Note will discuss the 
basis and rationale behind the claims presented by the Klamath 
irrigators. 
a. The Irrigators’ Takings Claim 
The irrigators’ first claim is that the BOR’s refusal to divert water 
for irrigation constitutes a taking because the action involved a 
government agency taking private property for public use without just 
compensation.149 It is well established that the federal government 
may take private property for government activities through its power 
of eminent domain.150 The only limitations on this power are found 
within the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.151 Specifically, the 
Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to refrain from 
taking private unless the property is taken for public benefit and the 
government pays the property’s owner just compensation for the 
property.152 This clause ensures that the federal government cannot 
confiscate private property unless the confiscation is for the benefit of 
the public and the property’s owner is compensated for the 
confiscated property.153 While there is no definitive test for 
determining what government actions constitute takings in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment, there are several elements that may be 
balanced in order to make a reasonable determination about the 
existence of a taking.154 
Typically, government takings are divided into two categories: 
regulatory and possessory takings.155 The latter form of government 
takings relate to the traditional concept of a taking and are fairly 
 
148 Id. at 510. 
149 Id. 
150 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 639 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
151 Id. at 640. 
152 Id. “The Fifth Amendment states ‘nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.’” Id. 
153 Id. The clause is intended to prevent the government from forcing a few people to 
bear burdens imposed by the public, or for the public good. The idea being that it is in the 
interest of fairness and justice that the costs of public interests “should be borne by the 
public as a whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
154 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 640–41. 
155 Id. at 641. 
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straightforward. According to Erwin Chemerinsky, “[a] ‘possessory’ 
[taking] occurs when the government confiscates or physically 
occupies property.”156 In a situation where the government actually 
takes control of private property, courts will always find that the 
government’s action constitutes a taking.157 
However, the concept of government takings has changed over 
time. In the twentieth century, the federal government began to 
introduce regulations that impacted private property. In some 
instances, these regulations prevented private parties from exercising 
control over their private property.158 Finding that the government’s 
actions could prevent private parties from exercising control over 
their property, the Court held that “while property may be regulated to 
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”159 According to Justice Holmes’ opinion in Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon, while the government must be allowed to regulate 
property, when a regulation limits the control that the property owner 
has over his or her property by “mak[ing] it commercially 
impracticable” to use the property, the regulation “has nearly the 
same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or 
destroying” the property.160 
This new form of government taking, known as a regulatory 
taking, is much harder to identify than the traditional possessory 
taking.161 The Court has never reduced the concept “to a formula or 
rules”; instead, it has identified regulatory takings on a case-by-case 
basis.162 However, “[t]he Court has articulated general criteria” for 
evaluating when a regulation rises to the level of a regulatory 
taking.163 To aid in the identification of regulatory takings, the Court 
uses “three factors which have ‘particular significance’: (1) the 
 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 
(1982), where the Supreme Court “declared: ‘[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge 
to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a 
taking’”). 
158 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 646 (citing Justice Holmes’ declaration in Pa. 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). 
159 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes noted that while the federal government 
must have room to regulate property, there must be some limit to the control that the 
federal government can exercise over property through regulation. Id. 
160 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 646 (quoting Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 647. 
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economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with investment-back 
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.”164 
As previously noted, the Court has never identified a specific test 
for determining when a government regulation is a taking, but when 
the Court’s decisions are compared a major principle of regulatory 
takings law emerges. This principle is that the existence of a 
regulatory taking is highly reliant on the expectations of the property 
owner for his or her property.165 The idea is that when a government 
regulation leaves a property owner with no reasonable economically 
viable use of his or her property, that regulation constitutes a 
regulatory taking.166 These cases establish that the Court has 
determined that if a property owner (a) expected to use their property 
for a purpose; but (b) a government regulation enacted after his or her 
purchase of the property makes that purpose economically unviable; 
and (c) there is no other economically viable purpose for the property, 
that regulation constitutes a regulatory taking.167 
The rationale behind this doctrine is that the government may 
legally exercise regulatory control over private property, but there is a 
limit to this control, and when the regulatory control the government 
exercises devalues property in a manner that rises to the level of 
possessory control over a piece of property, that regulation acts like, 
and is, a taking. 
In the present case, the United States Court of Appeals determined 
that in order to make a finding in regard to the irrigators’ takings 
claim, it had to first carry out a two-part test.168 The first step that the 
court determined it needed to take was to determine whether the 
irrigators identified a “cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest” 
when they asserted the “subject of the taking.”169 The court then 
 
164 Id. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)). 
165 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 647–48 (comparing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of N.Y.C., 438 U.S. 104 (1978) with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 
(1992)). Chemerinsky cites Justice Scalia’s determination that that when a regulation 
“denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land,” that regulation constitutes a 
government taking unless the property was purchased at a time when the regulation was 
already impacting the land. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
166 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150 at 647–48. 
167 Id. at 647–48. 
168 Klamath II, 635 F.3d 505, 511 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
169 Id. 
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declared that if it found that the irrigators’ had asserted a cognizable 
property interest, it would then determine whether the “government’s 
action amounted to a compensable taking of” the irrigators’ property 
interest.170 
The Klamath irrigators claim that they held a cognizable property 
interest in the water of the Klamath and that the BOR’s refusal to 
release water from the Klamath Project amounted to a compensable 
taking of that property interest.171 The basic premise of the irrigators’ 
argument is that their appropriation rights are equitable or beneficial 
property interests cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.172 
Therefore, the irrigators argue that by declining to release water as 
required by the irrigator’s appropriative rights, the BOR took control 
of their private rights to appropriate water in order to fulfill a public 
purpose without justly compensating them for the loss of their right to 
appropriate water.173 
The irrigators’ takings claim rests on their assumption that their 
appropriative rights are property interests cognizable under the Fifth 
Amendment.174 In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland 
Cement Co.,175 the United States Supreme Court established that 
states alone have the authority to appropriate and distribute water 
within their borders.176 In 1978, the Court clarified this authority 
regarding water in its opinion delivered in California v. United 
States.177 The Court’s determination in California established that 
states may impose conditions on water held in federal reclamation 
projects so long as the conditions imposed by state law are not 
inconsistent with any clear “congressional directives” relating to the 
federal project.178 
Read together, Beaver Portland Cement and California indicate 
that the Court interprets the Reclamation Act to assign to state law the 
authority to determine the appropriate control and distribution of 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 510. 
172 Id. at 511; Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 507, 540 (2005). 
173 Klamath II, 635 F.3d at 510–11. 
174 Id.; see Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 516, 540. 
175 Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). 
176 Id. at 163–65. 
177 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978). 
178 Id. at 674–75. 
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water.179 Therefore, the main question presented by the irrigators in 
Klamath I and II is whether, under Oregon law, appropriative rights 
are property rights cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.180 The 
Oregon Supreme Court holds that appropriative rights can constitute 
property interests in Oregon.181 In its en banc certified decision, the 
court did not explicitly outline what elements elevate an appropriative 
right to a property interest.182 What the court’s opinion does is 
establish under Oregon law that a private party may establish an 
equitable or beneficial property interests in an appropriative right.183 
However, the court does not specify what an equitable or beneficial 
property interest is, or clarify how such interests are developed.184 The 
only concrete answer provided by the court relating to the status of 
equitable or beneficial property interests in water under Oregon law is 
that the application of water to a beneficial use is necessary for 
establishing a property interest in water, but this application alone 
will not establish a property interest.185 Instead, the court articulated 
that there are three factors that, when read together, are necessary for 
the establishment of a property interest under Oregon law. These 
factors include the following actions: (1) whether the water right was 
appurtenant to the land–whether water from a federal project was 
applied to a party’s land for a beneficial use; (2) a determination 
regarding the relationship between the federal government and the 
party; and finally, (3) the impact of any contractual agreements 
 
179 See generally Klamath I, 67 Fed. Cl. at 519 (discussing the idea that any property 
interest related to water is determined by state law, as established by Justice Rehnquist in 
his opinion delivered in California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 667 (1978)). 
180 See Klamath I, 67 Fed Cl. at 518–19 (citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that 
state water law controls the appropriation and distribution of water). 
181 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States (Certification Decision), 227 P.3d 1145, 
1161 (Or. 2010). 
182 Id. at 1169–70. Justice Walters notes in a concurring opinion that the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s decision does not elaborate on what the concept of equitable title is for 
the purpose of a takings claim. Id. The concurring opinion stresses that while the Oregon 
Supreme Court has established that an appropriative right may constitute a property 
interest, the court has not resolved the difficult legal questions: what is an equitable or 
beneficial property interests in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s concept of 
“property,” and how are such interests established? Id. at 1171. Additionally, the Oregon 
Justice argues that while the Oregon Supreme Court has recognized the property interest 
can exist in Oregon, the court has not articulated how or why it exists. Id. at 62. 
183 Klamath II, 635 F.3d 505, 516 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
184 See Certification Decision, 227 P.3d at 1162–63. 
185 Id. at 1162. 
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between the party and the federal government.186 The court argues 
that when these factors are weighed together they will enable a court 
to determine whether an appropriative right is a property interest 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.187 
In the present case, the irrigators assert that they put the water they 
received through their appropriative rights to beneficial use on their 
land and have therefore developed equitable title, or an equitable 
property interest, in the waters of the Klamath–water held in legal title 
by the BOR.188 Therefore, they are asking the courts, the Federal 
Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals, and the Oregon Supreme 
Court, to determine whether their use of their appropriative rights 
have developed their rights into private property interests. 
b. The Irrigators’ Violation of Compact Claim 
The irrigators’ second claim relates to the BOR’s violation of the 
interstate compact relating to the Klamath River that exists between 
California, Oregon, and the BOR.189 The irrigators argue that the 
federal government’s interference with the water distribution 
promised under the compact constituted a taking. 
c. The Irrigators’ Breach of Contract Claim 
The irrigator’s final claim relates to the individual contracts that 
they entered into with the BOR.190 In support of their breach of 
contract claims, the irrigators argue that the BOR had a contractual 
duty to provide water to their irrigation projects in accordance with 
their contracts.191 Therefore, they allege that through the BOR’s 
refusal to fulfill its duty by making its contractual deliveries of water, 
the BOR breached its contracts with the irrigators. 
3. What Is Happening with the Case? 
On February 17, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals 
remanded Klamath II back down to the Federal Court of Claims for 
further litigation.192 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals instructed the 
 
186 See id. at 1163–65. 
187 Id. at 1163. 




192 Id. at 519. 
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Court of Claims to make further determinations regarding the 
irrigators’ taking claims based on the Certification Decision issued by 
the Oregon Supreme Court in 2010.193 Additionally, the Court of 
Appeals instructed the Court of Claims to make a case-by-case 
determination regarding each of the surviving compact and takings 
claims.194 Finally, the Court of Appeals instructed the Court of Claims 
to determine whether it was impossible for the federal government to 




The Klamath litigation has been remanded back to the Court of 
Federal Claims for further determination relating to the takings and 
contract claims presented by the irrigators. The Court of Federal 
Claims must now evaluate the irrigator’s claims in light of the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s certification decision, and determine (1) whether the 
irrigators’ appropriative rights are property rights cognizable under 
the Fifth Amendment; (2) whether the BOR’s action took or impaired 
those rights; and finally, (3) whether the BOR breached its contractual 
obligations owed to the irrigators. 
In the following paragraphs, this Note will discuss the claims 
presented by the irrigators and argue that if the Court of Federal 
Claims is forced to make a finding regarding the irrigators’ takings 
claim, it should find that the expectation interests that the irrigators in 
Klamath River Basin developed via appropriation rights do not 
constitute property interests cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. 
A. Step One: The Irrigators’ Contract Claims 
The Court of Federal Claims should first attempt to resolve the 
contract claims presented by the irrigators. By resolving the irrigators’ 
complaint on a basis of contract law, the Court of Claims would not 
only be able to quickly resolve the dispute, but would also avoid the 
larger constitutional question presented by the parties. 
 
193 Id. 
194 Klamath II, 635 F.3d at 519. 
195 Id. at 522. 
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1. The Avoidance Doctrine 
The avoidance doctrine is a prudential tool intended to preserve 
judicial restraint.196 Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court 
refused to make determinations on issues based on questions of 
constitutional law when the case could be resolved on non-
constitutional grounds.197 Today, the Court’s application of the 
doctrine is less stringent, and, as a result, it has decided to rule on an 
increasing number of constitutional issues. This willingness to hear 
and rule on sweeping constitutional issues is especially important for 
cases like Klamath where disputes of law are complicated and have 
long and conflicting histories. 
Legal scholars argue that the rationale behind the avoidance 
doctrine is that it allows the Court to let constitutional issues 
“simmer” until the Court believes that the public is ready to accept a 
decision on the issue.198 If this is the case, then the conflict in the 
Klamath Basin provides the Court with an exceptional example of the 
crossroads that has emerged in water law in the United States. 
Klamath is a case that pits the status quo of western water politics 
against the demands of the twenty-first century. While there may be a 
rationale for avoiding the constitutional issues implicated by Klamath 
and resolving the case on a contract basis, the Court may view 
Klamath as an opportunity to clarify and develop the relationship 
between states and the federal government in regard to water 
allocation. 
The avoidance doctrine is based on a collection of judicially 
created rules for handling constitutional issues that appear in cases.199 
The doctrine has a long and tumultuous history.200 First described by 
 
196 See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 
1004–05 (1994). 
197 Id. at 1004–07. 
198 Id. at 1043–44. 
199 Id. at 1016–17. 
200 See id. at 1004. In 1833, John Marshall urged courts to avoid reviewing unnecessary 
constitutional issues. Id. This general idea that the only time a court should rule on a 
constitutional issue is when there is no other avenue for resolution was the first articulation 
of the general doctrine of avoidance. Id. However, since 1833 courts have not always 
adhered to the idea that if a constitutional issue can be avoided it should be avoided at all 
costs. See id. at 1007–08. For instance, the modern Court has on several occasions tackled 
constitutional issues even though the particular cases could have been resolved without 
resorting to making a determination on the constitutional grounds. See id.; Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1(1993); Romer v. Evans, 57 U.S. 620 (1996). 
DUNLAP (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2013  2:08 PM 
2013] Does First In Time Really Mean First In Right? 143 
Exploring Water Rights in the Context of 
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States 
Justice Brandeis in 1936,201 the doctrine has been applied by courts 
throughout the United States in an attempt to limit the instances of 
courts unnecessarily ruling on constitutional issues. Using this 
doctrine, courts are able to resolve disputes on grounds that do not 
implicate the U.S. Constitution, even though constitutional grounds 
for resolution are properly before the court.202 
The doctrine enables courts to refrain from making sweeping 
determinations regarding constitutional questions every time a 
constitutional question may be implicated in a dispute it is charged 
with resolving.203 This ability to refrain from determining 
constitutional instances is a major justification for the doctrine of 
avoidance because it solidifies the ability of judges to use restraint 
when ruling on issues that may implicate separation of powers 
issues.204  Therefore, the doctrine “furthers principles of separation of 
powers by essentially showing greater respect for the coordinate 
branches of government – particularly the legislature.”205 By avoiding 
the constitutional question, courts attempt to start a dialogue between 
the branches of government.206 The goal of this exercise is to put the 
other branches of government on notice of the constitutional issues 
regarding a specific regulation.207 The Court believes that by putting 
the branches on notice, they will have an opportunity to correct any 
 
201 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936). In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Brandeis argues that “[t]he Court developed, for its own governance in the 
cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided 
passing upon . . . the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” Id. 
202 Id. at 347. 
203 Id. 
204 Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1013; Michelle R. Slack, Avoiding Campaign 
Finance Reform: Examining the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance in Campaign 
Finance Reform Law in Light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 16 
NEXCJLP 153, 157 (2010–2011). 
205 Slack, supra note 204, at 153. The idea being that Congress is sworn to uphold the 
laws of the United States, namely the Constitution. Therefore, the Court should attempt to 
interpret the law that is questioned as being unconstitutional in a manner that is 
constitutional. The idea seems to be that the judiciary branch should give the legislature 
the benefit of the doubt, and just clarify what the legislature “meant” to say when creating 
the law—even if the court’s interpretation is explicitly contradictory to the legislative 
intent of the law. Id. 
206 Id. at 157. 
207 Id. 
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inconsistencies between their regulations and the Constitution, 
thereby, preserving the power of their branch.208 
Justice Brandeis’ rationale for his belief that courts should avoid 
ruling on constitutional issues was the fact that he felt that, “judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislative acts [constitutes] a grave 
and delicate power for use by fallible, human judges only when its 
use cannot conscientiously be avoided.”209 To help courts better 
understand the doctrine of avoidance, he created a list of seven rules 
that courts should follow when determining whether a constitutional 
issue is right for court review.210 
Historically, courts have followed Justice Brandeis’ rules for 
passing on constitutional issues. Justice Brandeis’ rules are as 
follows: (1) Courts will not make a determination of the 
constitutionality of legislation in a “friendly, non-adversary, 
proceeding” because such questions are only legitimately before the 
court as a “last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, 
earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.”211 (2) “The Court 
will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it . . . [i]t is not the habit of the court to decide 
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a 
decision of the case.’”212 (3) “The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to 
which it is to be applied.’”213 (4) “The Court will not pass upon a 
constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if 
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be 
disposed of.”214 (5) Courts will not determine the validity of a statute 
unless the claimant is actually injured by its operation.215 (6) “The 
Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the 
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.”216 (7) Even if 
there is a “serious doubt” about the constitutionality of an action of 
 
208 Id.; Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. at 346–47. Justice Brandeis argues 
that the Court should only pass on a constitutional question as a last resort. Id. 
209 Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1015. 
210 Id. at 1016. 
211 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346; Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1016. 
212 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346–47; Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1017. 
213 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347; Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1017. 
214 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added); Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 
1017. 
215 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347; Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1017. 
216 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348; Kloppenberg, supra note 196, at 1017. 
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the legislature, “it is a cardinal principle that” the courts should first 
ascertain whether the court can find a construction of the statute that 
may avoid the question of constitutionality of the statute.217 
To avoid making decisions that implicate substantial constitutional 
questions, courts most commonly use Justice Brandeis’ Ashwander 
avoidance rule.218 Courts use this rule in order to refrain from striking 
down statutes entirely.219 Instead, by applying Brandeis’ Ashwander 
rule from the avoidance doctrine, courts are able to “give[] effect to 
congressional intent” instead of simply subverting it by striking down 
the statute altogether.220 By using avoidance to read congressional 
action in a light that does not annoy the Constitution, courts force 
legislators to consider the constitutional implications of their actions 
prior to enacting legislation that may fly against “constitutional 
norms.”221 
2. If the Court Finds that BOR Did Breach Its Contract(s) 
If, after reviewing the contracts existing between the irrigators and 
the BOR, the Court of Federal Claims finds that the BOR violated its 
contractual duties, the court could resolve Klamath on a contract law 
basis. This action would enable the court to avoid the politically 
charged constitutional issues implicated in the case. While this action 
would not alleviate the confusion surrounding water rights in Oregon, 
it would follow the traditional doctrine of avoidance, and allow the 
court to reserve resolution of the highly charged issues relating to the 
status of allocation rights as property until a later date. This decision 
could reserve a ruling on the status of allocation rights for the 
finalization of the pending adjudication of the Klamath watershed. 
3. The Likely Outcome of This Decision 
Because the opinion issued by the Court of Federal Claims reveals 
little about the actual contracts existing between the BOR and the 
irrigators, it is hard to say what the likely outcome of the court’s 
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decision would be. However, a determination based on contract law 
would be the simplest resolution for this case. 
This form of resolution is attractive in this instance because it 
would allow the court to make case-by-case determinations regarding 
the existence of a breach of contract instead of making sweeping 
determinations about a status of appropriative rights. Additionally, 
this form of resolution would allow more time for Oregon as a state to 
come to a determination about the status of appropriative rights within 
its jurisdiction–a task that the Court has explicitly attributed to state 
regulatory authority.222 However, the impact of such a resolution 
could be far reaching. 
In the alternative, a decision based on contract law could be less 
attractive because it would leave a number of important questions 
regarding appropriative rights unanswered. Klamath provides the 
courts with an opportunity to address specific questions relating to 
appropriative rights that have remained unanswered for over a 
century. While there is a strong argument for avoiding the 
constitutional questions at the heart of the litigation, there is arguably 
an even more compelling rationale for choosing to forgo avoidance 
and answer the long-standing questions head on. 
However, depending on the outcome of the Court of Claims review 
of the contracts existing between the BOR and the irrigators, the 
argument for avoiding the constitutional question may simply be 
moot. If there is no contractual basis for resolving the dispute, the 
court will be required to tackle the irrigators’ primary claim that the 
BOR’s action constitutes a taking. 
B. Step Two: The Irrigators’ Takings Claim 
As discussed earlier, to successfully establish that the BOR’s 
action constitutes a taking, the irrigators must prove that their 
appropriative rights are cognizable property interests under the Fifth 
Amendment and that the BOR’s action either took or unreasonably 
interfered with the use of that property interest.223 
To make this determination, the Court of Claims must first 
determine whether the irrigators’ appropriation rights constitute 
equitable or beneficial property interests under Oregon law. After 
making this determination, the court will then need to determine 
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whether such property interests constitute cognizable property 
interests under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, if the court determines 
that the property interests held by the irrigators in the appropriative 
rights are property interests cognizable under the Fifth Amendment, 
the court will need to determine whether the BOR’s actions interfered 
with the property interest in a manner that constituted a taking.224 
1. An Appropriative Right as a Beneficial Property Interest 
The Oregon Supreme Court has held that appropriative rights can 
become property interests.225 The court explained that the relationship 
and contractual obligations that exist between an appropriator and the 
federal government can establish expectations in water delivery from 
the federal government that rise to the level of a beneficial or 
equitable property interest.226 However, the court refrained from 
making a firm determination about the question of title to water prior 
to the issuance of a determination based on the currently pending 
Klamath Basin adjudication, a project attempting to determine what 
parties hold firm rights to water in the Klamath Basin.227 
The court’s reluctance to make a firm determination about rights 
relating to water in the Klamath Basin indicates that the court was 
unwilling to either define or classify what an appropriative right is in 
the context of property. Because the court did not define these rights, 
holders of appropriative rights in Oregon may hold equitable or 
beneficial property interests in their promised diversions of water, in 
the form of a paper appropriation right, but they do not know what 
such interests are in the context of property law. 
This means that even if an appropriator were found to possess an 
equitable or beneficial interest, it is unlikely that a court would be 
able to confidently determine what that interest amounts to in the 
context of the property clause of the Fifth Amendment. This situation 
raises important questions about the law governing water allocation in 
Oregon and the law governing water allocation throughout the West. 
Specifically, the situation begs the question of what character of 
government action and interference constitute a taking when the 
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availability of the property, in this case, water, is dependent on natural 
systems over which the government has no control. 
2. Water Rights and the Fifth Amendment 
The appropriation rights at issue in Klamath are derived from 
Oregon’s system of prior appropriation.228 This means that in Oregon, 
“the rights of the prior users of water [are protected] against the rights 
of subsequent users.”229 These rights are typically viewed as 
“usufructuary,” which means that the rights associated with the right 
are related to use and not ownership.230 In the context of the Klamath 
River, this means that owners of an appropriative right have the right 
to put a defined quantity of water to beneficial use every year, and 
from that use they are entitled to enjoyment and economic benefit.231 
The right of a holder of an appropriative right to exercise his or her 
rights to divert water is limited by the requirements inherent in the 
doctrine of prior appropriation and the state’s interests in regulating 
water.232 
Specifically, the Supreme Court established in Hinderliner v. La 
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. 233 that states possess an 
equitable interest in water and can only grant appropriative rights in 
accordance with their own equitable share of the watercourse.234 This 
decision indicates that states may not grant rights to water that are 
greater than the equitable share that the state possesses.235 Therefore, 
when a state grants an appropriative right based on a state adopted 
system of prior appropriation, it is unlikely that the grant authorizes 
the transfer of any rights beyond those held by the state. 
Using this rationale as a basis for understanding the rights 
transferred from the federal government to the states through the 
 
228 See Klamath II, 635 F.3d at 511-14. 
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Equal Footing Doctrine, this Note argues that the federal government 
did not likely transfer more rights to appropriators in the Klamath 
Basin than it transferred to the states via the Equal Footing Doctrine. 
Instead, it seems clear that rights associated with water are less 
defined and less exclusive than those associated with traditional 
property protected from government invasion by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
If the Court of Federal Claims attempts to determine whether the 
BOR’s actions constitute a taking, it will need to conduct a fact-based 
analysis of the government’s action.236 This analysis will need to 
balance the reasonableness of the irrigators’ investment-backed 
expectation to receive water from the Klamath Project against the 
reasonableness of the governments action–basically the court will 
need to conduct a balancing test that weighs the reasonableness of the 
public action against the harm that it caused the irrigator’s private 
property interests.237 Through this process the court will need to 
determine the reasonableness of the irrigators’ expectation to receive 
water during years of drought.238 From there, the court would  
evaluate whether the action of the BOR deprived the owners of 
property of the economic use of that property.239 Basically, the court 
will need to determine whether the irrigators’ expectation that they 
would receive water for irrigation in 2001 was reasonable, and if it 
was, whether the regulation singled out a specific group to bear the 
burden of the regulation.240 
If the court finds that the irrigators had a property interest, that the 
property interest held by the irrigators was protected under the Fifth 
Amendment, and that BOR’s action required the irrigators to bear the 
economic burden of an action directed at protecting the public as a 
whole, the court will find that the BOR’s action constituted a taking. 
If the court finds that the BOR committed a taking, it will require the 
BOR to compensate the irrigators for the temporary destruction of 
their appropriative rights. 
This resolution will compensate irrigators who were impacted by a 
federal regulation, but will not resolve water distribution problems in 
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the West. Instead, this Note argues that this resolution will only 
further cloud the status of water in the West. By turning allocation 
rights into property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, the 
court would make it virtually impossible for the government to 
regulate water quantities and qualities in the West because of the cost 
of such regulation. Such elevation of appropriative rights would 
increase the value of appropriative rights by establishing them as a 
commodity and requiring the government to compensate owners for 
any impairments caused by federal regulation intended to promote 
environmental integrity in hydrological systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Elevating water rights to the status of a Fifth Amendment property 
interest would upset the ancient understanding of water as a common 
shared resource, would undermine the requirements for commerce 
dictated in the Constitution, and would forever restrict the public’s 
access to water. This situation would compensate irrigators with 
unrealistic expectations for water deliveries and elevate their rights 
above the rights of the general public. A decision that elevates 
appropriative rights to property rights would also further entrench 
wasteful agricultural practices that preserve the status quo, by 
alleviating any incentive for irrigators to reduce their diversions from 
struggling hydrological systems instead of encouraging more 
sustainable practices. 
Prior appropriation explicitly protects the rights of senior 
appropriators over the rights of more junior appropriators. The United 
States government is the most senior appropriator in the West. While 
it severed water rights from its land grants in 1877, it did not destroy 
its own riparian rights to the water. It instead possesses the most 
senior right to the water of the west, and it has entrusted the states to 
share in its duty by granting them the authority to distribute water in a 
manner that is most beneficial to the public. If the rights to 
appropriate water issued by the states instead granted a person an 
absolute right to appropriate water at the expense of the public as a 
whole, then water would no longer be a shared common resource in 
the United States; instead, it will be forever viewed as a commodity 
that is only available to the highest bidder, a situation that is 
inconsistent with both the federal government’s constitutional 
requirements and the states’ public trust doctrine requirements. 
 
